Legal Foundations and
Essential Treaty Elements for
a System of Common Security in Outer Space

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About the Author

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The author presents his personal views.
Introduction

Jonathan Granoff, Esq., President, Global Security Institute

The skills of law and diplomacy define the direction nations will take in dealing with one another. When these skills fail us, the natural tendency to quest for power and dominance fueled by fear and competition overrides our similarly natural tendency toward cooperation and creativity, fueled by hope.

We have mastered energies operating at a subatomic level and have even begun to unravel mysteries of the genetic code. As we have progressed into ever new realms of discovery, capacities for blessing and cursing ourselves as a human community become ever more pronounced. Will we use this new knowledge to develop new devices to pursue dominance or advance our common interests? Will we learn how to fuel our economies in new renewable fashions and advance our health and well-being or will we make new exotic weapons?

The firmaments represent a new frontier in which we must answer these kinds of questions. As we relate to each other on this earthen sphere, so shall it be reflected above us. There is a framework for ensuring that we do it correctly. Dr. Detlev Wolter has succinctly and clearly set forth a path that will allow us to look upward and say to ourselves, "Behold, even above us we have found a way to work together for our common well being and peace."

The Global Security Institute is proud that he has permitted us to share these important essays with the world. Thank you, Dr. Wolter.
Legal Foundations and Essential Treaty Elements for a System of Common Security in Outer Space

Dr. Detlev Wolter

May 2007

A. Introduction

This article presents the legal foundations and the essential elements for a Treaty of Common (Cooperative) Security in Outer Space.¹

There is an urgent need for a comprehensive space security order that starts with a space arms control regime and also encompasses positive elements of cooperative space security like confidence-building measures, rules of the road, international verification as well as institutional structures.² The need for such a preventive arms control regime cannot be overemphasized. As Jonathan Dean³ has pointed out:

“... humanity is on the verge of an irreversible shift to active, destructive, military use of outer space, a global revolution in human security which will almost certainly surpass in significance the introduction of nuclear weapons.”

B. Foundations of Common Security in Outer Space

I. International Law, in particular the Outer Space Treaty and GA Resolutions on PAROS

Both contain several essential principles serving as the foundation of a CSO-Treaty:

(1) The use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes and in the common interest of all states and mankind as a whole.⁴

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According to Article II of the Outer Space Treaty Outer Space⁵ outer space is a common territory beyond national jurisdiction, the global commons par excellence. In addition, the Outer Space Treaty provides in Articles I Para. 1 and IX for cooperation and consultation principles. Hence, security cannot be pursued in the interest of one State or a group of States. Instead, it has to be common or cooperative security.

The legal order for outer space that exists today was elaborated in close relation to the international community’s efforts to prevent the space powers from entering into an arms race in space. From the beginning of the space age, the international community raised the claim that the exploration and use of outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes in the interest, and to the benefit, of mankind.
as a whole. The US and the USSR introduced the principle of peaceful use in proposals aimed towards developing a legal order that would limit the military use of outer space. The US proposed to the UN General Assembly in 1957 in its first memorandum devoted to arms control in outer space, that the United Nations should establish a multilateral control system with “international inspection and participation” as “the first step toward the objective of assuring that future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.”

(2) The obligation to prevent the weaponization of space

The deployment of space weapons would clearly not be a use in the “interests of all states”, it would thus violate Article I OST. While the international community has accepted passive military uses of outer space, such as reconnaissance satellites, communication satellites, it clearly opposes the transgression of the threshold towards active uses of outer space of a destructive nature. Since 1981, the annual resolutions of the UN General Assembly regarding outer space and for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, have repeatedly requested the nuclear powers to:

- Actively participate in the prevention of an arms race in outer space “with a view to reaching agreement” as well as to restart or speed up parallel bilateral arms control negotiations concerning outer space;
- Refrain from any contrary activities.

Recently, Sri Lanka at the last First Committee meeting declared the PAROS Resolution in substance to be customary international law. In addition, the GA in several PAROS resolutions stated explicitly that the NPT disarmament obligation also applies to outer space. As the ICJ has stated in its Advisory Opinion in 1996 this is an obligation to conclude not only to negotiate a disarmament agreement.

II. The Concept of Common Security (“Gemeinsame Sicherheit” by Egon Bahr/Hans Dieter Lutz)/Cooperative Security (Brookings Institution)

1. The origins of the concept of “Common Security”

Given the capability of mutually assured destruction, security can no longer be achieved against, but rather with the opponent. In this sense, common security is already a reality. The recognition that in the atomic era peace and security can only be guaranteed cooperatively, and that war as the continuation of politics by other means has been replaced by the absolute “futility of war” lies at the heart of the concept of “common” or cooperative security. Helmut Schmidt in his speech before the First UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 marked the starting point for its development by introducing the notion of “security partnership”. The concept met international recognition with the Palme Commission’s report of 1982 under the title of “Common Security” stating: “Security in the nuclear age is common security.” The report was welcomed in the same year through Resolution 37/99 of the UN General Assembly, which emphasized the central role of the United Nations in furthering common security, and mandated the Disarmament Commission to examine the recommendations with a view of its efficient implementation.
In a similar vein, German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer,\(^1\) put his speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 September 2002 under the *Leitmotiv* of the need to establish a “system of global co-operative security”, declaring it to be a “central political task of the 21st century”.

2. **The structural elements of “Common Security”**

The main elements of “common security” were elaborated by Hans-Dieter Lutz and Egon Bahr,\(^2\), former State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, as well by the *Brookings Institution*\(^3\) under the notion of “cooperative security” falling into five categories:

1. **Cooperative denuclearization**
   The defensive reorientation of military-strategic forces allows for the drastic reduction and eventually abolishment of nuclear weapons: Thus, the concept contributes to the fulfilment of the nuclear powers’ disarmament obligation according to Article VI of the NPT, as reaffirmed by the ICJ.

2. **Structural nonprovocation and defensive configurations**
   Structural nonprovocation implies that military forces are to be organized and equipped in a way, that they do not permit a successful military attack. Cooperative denuclearization is strengthened in a mutually reinforcing way by establishing force postures structurally incapable of supporting a nuclear attack.

3. **Internationalization of the response to an aggression**
   While the restructuring of the military capabilities towards an exclusively defensive configuration, buttressed by arms control regulations, would offer a maximum degree of international security, it could not be excluded, however, that in circumventing the agreed rules a particular state would secretly develop an offensive capability. Therefore, as part of a reassurance system the right to self-defence in the framework of a collective security system remains necessary.

4. **Restraints on military investment and proliferation**

5. **Transparency and confidence-building measures**
   A central part of common security, which has to be understood as a process, is the multilateralization and possible institutionalization of transparency and confidence-building measures.

C. **A Multilateral Agreement for ‘Common Security’ in Outer Space (CSO-Treaty)**

I. **Precursors**

The proposal for a CSO-Treaty builds on the numerous treaty proposals of Member States,\(^4\) the work of the PAROS WG (before it was discontinued),\(^5\) and of the Expert Group on Confidence-Building in Outer Space,\(^6\) as well as on the important academic and NGO contributions regarding PAROS.\(^7\)
The most comprehensive suggestions for an encompassing security order to safeguard the peaceful use of outer space came from the group of government experts (US, Russia, China, France, Canada, India, Pakistan, Bulgaria, Egypt, Argentina, Brazil and Zimbabwe) mandated in 1990 by the UN General Assembly to work out proposals for confidence-building measures in outer space. In its report, \(^{23}\) the group suggests i.a. the following measures to be agreed in the CD and COPUOS: transparency measures concerning dual-use technology to secure its use for exclusively peaceful purposes, multilateral use of satellite remote sensing in the interest of the international community, as well as the creation of an international early warning system concerning accidents in outer space, “rules of the road” including safety margins between space objects, use of space technology for preventive diplomacy, crisis management, peaceful settlement of conflicts, establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency and an International Space Monitoring Agency, and of a world space organization to promote confidence-building and cooperation in outer space in such issues as remote sensing, environmental monitoring, crisis prevention and forecasts of natural catastrophes.

II. A multilateral agreement on common/cooperative security in outer space (CSO Treaty) as a specialized agreement to implement the Outer Space Treaty in the field of security

1. Principles of the CSO Treaty

Taking into account the recommendations of the report of the Palme Commission on Common Security and the report of the UN experts group on confidence-building measures in outer space, the CSO Treaty should contain the following principles:

1. 1. Common/cooperative security

The CSO Treaty is based on the application of the concept of “common security” to outer space. It implements the obligation of the Outer Space Treaty on the use of outer space in the interest of mankind in the security field. At the same time it buttresses the necessary nuclear strategic transition towards mutual assured security in an adequate multilateral framework, which the nuclear powers have to set in place in order to fulfil their disarmament obligation under Article VI of the NPT. The concept of common security must be complemented by specific strategic elements going beyond the classic confidence-building measures. In particular the multilateralization of the American-Russian “cooperative threat reduction” (CTR) programmes would lay the ground for a global system of cooperative threat reduction and an effective non-proliferation regime.

1. 2. Delimitation between general provisions on cooperative security and specific nuclear-strategic questions

It is necessary to distinguish between general provisions on cooperative security and specific issues of nuclear strategy, where the main responsibility for filling the cooperative security structures lies undoubtedly with the three major nuclear powers and potential opponents USA, Russia and China. Therefore, with regard to a “new strategic framework” and a “cooperative strategic transition” it would be difficult to
regulate these in detail in the multilateral CSO Treaty. Such a far-fledged multilateralization of nuclear-strategic questions would hardly be acceptable at present to the nuclear powers. As a start, it should suffice to provide the general principles and procedures regarding the necessary interface of these issues with the general security interests of the international community, including a flexible institutional arrangement, e.g. limited membership in a Standing Consultative Committee.

1. 3. Transparency, confidence-building and strategic confidence measures ("strategic reassurance measures")

The CSO Treaty is based on the principles of transparency and confidence-building in the use of the common space in the security interests of mankind as a whole. It thus complements existing confidence-building provisions in the Outer Space Treaty, and those in the Registration Convention, in particular by introducing a “pre-launch registration” and on-site inspection of launch sites as well as new strategic confidence-building measures such as “strategic reassurance measures” (SRM) and further cooperative security elements for outer space in the form of immunity and traffic rules for satellites.

1. 4. Structurally non-offensive force configurations, cooperative strategic transition and nuclear disarmament

Structurally non-offensive force configurations whereby armed forces are organized and equipped in such a way that does not permit a military offensive applied in outer space means that no active military uses of space could be permitted. A structurally non-offensive force configuration in outer space is thus best achieved by an explicit prohibition of active military uses of a destructive nature, i.e. a space weapons ban. It would also contribute to structurally non-defensive force configurations and nuclear disarmament on Earth by facilitating to overcome the strategy of nuclear deterrence.

The CSO Treaty creates the necessary conditions for a cooperative nuclear strategic transition. The strategic change would thus be oriented in accordance with the mankind-clause of the Outer Space Treaty towards the creation of common security for all states in the interest of mankind and guarantee at the same time that outer space will remain free of weapons. By limiting the number of ICBMs in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, the risk of unauthorized and accidental attacks would be considerably restrained, and thus the necessity of space-based defence systems further reduced. The Treaty thus leads in the long term to complete nuclear disarmament, to be monitored by cooperative verification including reliable on-site inspections in particular.

1. 4. Preventive arms control through a ban on active military uses of outer space

According to an expertise submitted to the German Bundestag the creation of cooperative structures and political cooperation alone would not suffice to prevent an arms race if they were not complemented by preventive arms control measures for technological developments. Preventive arms control is of particular importance regarding space technology. The development of space weapons would trigger both a quantitative and especially a qualitative arms race. Completely new and unforeseeable arms control and non-proliferation problems would arise with the
continuous advancement of new technologies and applied physics principles that preventive arms control would effectively shut off. By creating legal clarity as to the prohibition of the development, production and deployment of space weapons, the Treaty would prevent a new arms spiral in both variants in keeping with the objectives of preventive arms control. Although a ban already of development and production of space weapons might be too ambitious, an explicit prohibition of the deployment of space weapons in a multilateral treaty would have a strong effect to slow down, if not stop altogether, the development of space weapons.

1. 5. Principle of equality

The respect of the principle of equal security according to the UN Charter (Article 2 Para. 1) would be more than merely a formal legal aspect in a CSO Treaty. The main purpose of the Treaty would be to prevent the sharpening of security inequalities that would arise by a transgression to active military uses of outer space, by setting up a system of common, i.e. equal security.

2. The main elements of the CSO Treaty

Most of the essential elements of a cooperative security system in outer space have already been proposed in one form or another to the CD or partly in bilateral American-Soviet/Russian arms control treaties. Therefore, the main task ahead is to combine the individual elements in a mutually reinforcing manner to build a coherent cooperative security system. In particular, the principles of common security in outer space have to be developed in terms of both substance and procedure with regard to the following main elements:

2. 1. Principles of cooperative security in outer space

2. 1. 1. Particular provisions on cooperative security in outer space

(1) Transparency and confidence-building
The state parties should commit themselves to be guided in all their military space activities by the principles of transparency and confidence-building as proposed by the respective UN Government Experts Group. The Treaty would also facilitate the strengthening and possible extension of the various control regimes for missile technologies and WMD, including the regulation of the transfer of sensitive technologies, by i.a. enhancing and extending the current MTCR regime (ICoC). The use of multilateral satellite monitoring could encourage those states potentially acquiring ballistic missile technology to join such control regimes. A stimulus for this would be the prospect of a possible access to space technology for civil space activities offered under the common security regime.

(2) Structural non-provocation and defensive configurations
The state parties should commit themselves to conduct space activities in a way compatible with the principle of structurally non-offensive force configurations. A consultative committee to be set up would elaborate upon details.

(3) Non-proliferation and disarmament
The state parties should commit themselves to keep all military activities in outer space in conformity with the objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament according to Article VI of the NPT.

(4) Protection against unauthorized missile launches and attacks
In a cooperative framework the development of a limited (land – and air-based)-NMD system to combat ballistic missiles in the boost phase (“boost-phase NMD”) renouncing the deployment of any space weapons could be considered, ideally under international control. The tasks of such a system should be enumerated and thus limited to the protection:

- against unauthorized and accidental missile launches; and
- against missile attacks in violation of the non-proliferation regime for ballistic missile technology and WMD.

The implementation of the system would have to be secured by a multilateral monitoring and verification mechanism. A standing consultative committee should work out the details of such a consensual NMD deployment.

2. 1. 2. Ban of active military uses of a destructive nature

A central provision of the CSO Treaty should be an explicit prohibition of active and destructive military uses in outer space in order to achieve the necessary legal clarity with regard to the implementation of the principle of the peaceful use of outer space. This principle would thus be confirmed and specified through a ban on space weapons, namely by explicitly banning space-based ASAT and BMD weapons. Canada\textsuperscript{28} has rightly stated that without a general space weapons ban the prohibition of the use of force would also protect the deployment of space weapons. Such a result would run counter to the community-purpose of the peaceful use of the common space.

Concerning a prohibition of space weapons, in particular of a ban on space-based BMD and ASAT systems, five issues need to be tackled:

(1) Definition: the issue of so-called “non-dedicated systems”,\textsuperscript{29} i.e. the delimitation between prohibited ASAT systems from permitted civil space objects that could be misused such as through collision or docking, in an ASAT function;

(2) Verification: especially given the possible residual ASAT capability of “non-dedicated systems” an effective international verification is necessary including of missile launch pads \textit{in situ};

(3) Applicability of the prohibition also in the case of conflict;

(4) Verifiable destruction of existing ASAT capabilities, which should be complemented by also limiting the number of military satellite launches;

(5) Immunity of satellites: an explicit prohibition of ASATs should also ban non space-based ASAT systems and thus guarantee a complete protection of all peaceful satellites.

The Treaty stipulation prohibiting space weapons could read as follows:
The States Parties commit themselves to refrain from any deployment or use of any object in space or on Earth, that was designed or modified specifically for the purpose to inflict permanent physical damage on any other object through the projection of mass or energy respectively. In particular, the deployment of BMD and ASAT systems in outer space are prohibited, except for a system put under the aegis of the UN for the purpose of implementing and enforcing a non-proliferation regime and for the purpose of protecting against unauthorised and accidental missile launches on the decision of the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly.

Such a prohibition of active military uses of outer space corresponds to the requirements of a cooperative approach in the NMD issue. Thus, numerous American and international studies\(^{30}\) have shown that a space-based NMD system to intercept warheads in their midcourse in outer space would not be viewed as cooperative by Russia and China, but rather as destabilizing. An explicit prohibition of space-based BMD systems, with the exception of non-destructive sensor satellites, is indispensable to not only safeguard the principle of the peaceful use of outer space as a prerequisite for common security in outer space, but also to permit the necessary cooperative approach with regard to the nuclear-strategic and arms control questions raised by NMD.

2.2. Destruction of existing ASAT-capabilities/arsenals

Existing ASAT systems only have the capability to destroy satellites in near-Earth Orbit (NEO). The strategically important satellites used for early warning, navigation and precise guidance systems are stationed in the GEO or on other high-Earth Orbits, and are thus considered to be not yet at risk. However, LEO satellites fulfil important functions in crisis situations such as photo reconnaissance, ocean surveillance and electronic intelligence. Furthermore, as in the Gulf war, they deliver real-time intelligence to all military operations. In a crisis situation the fear that an opponent may destruct one’s satellites can represent an “irresistible temptation ... to remove such satellites from the sky”. It is, therefore, necessary to provide for the destruction of existing land and air-based ASAT systems not only as a matter of congruence with the prohibition of space-based ASAT systems, but also to safeguard the security in outer space in crisis situations.

2.3. Protection of civil space objects and passive military uses of a non-destructive nature

The creation of an immunity regime for civil space objects\(^{31}\) and satellites with passive military tasks of a non-destructive nature would be an important part of the confidence-building measures. By determining the range of the satellite uses protected under the immunity regime, the necessary legal clarity as to the admissibility of these uses would be achieved. Some believe that the prohibition of the use of force would be sufficient to protect existing satellite uses. This, however, does not take into account the fact that a number of states have voiced doubts as to the admissibility of even the existing passive military uses. This concerns in particular the use of satellites as precise guidance systems for nuclear weapons. An immunity regime is all the more necessary as the dual-use capabilities of most satellites may cause civil space objects to become targets of interference or attacks by ASAT weapons in a crisis situation.

An immunity regime for satellites, which would be specified by “rules of the road” in the framework of a “space code of conduct”,\(^{32}\) would be an important contribution to “traffic security” in the near-Earth and geostationary orbit. An important element
of such traffic rules would be to respect certain security distances as well as provisions to avoid collisions, which become necessary also for environmental protection against the increasing space debris.

2. 4. Mechanisms of implementation control: monitoring and verification

The CSO Treaty would contain appropriate mechanisms of implementation control through multilateral monitoring and verification of both the ban on space weapons as well as of the protection regime including the immunity rules for space objects used for peaceful purposes.

By having recourse to satellite reconnaissance, such a space weapons agreement could be reliably verified.

The range of possible verification measures spans from the classic “national technical means” (i.e. national military reconnaissance satellites) to both “passive cooperative” and “active cooperative” verification such as on-site-inspection in the form of “continuous monitoring”, “invitational inspections” or “challenge-inspection”(anytime-anywhere inspection).

In addition to a “space-to-Earth-verification”, outer space has a peculiar requirement for “ground-to-space” and “space-to-space” verification methods. For the monitoring of the proposed protection regime for civil space objects such as safety margins, a “space-to-space” verification seems indispensable. “Space-to-space”-verification could also be used for the monitoring of a space weapons ban, and for this purpose be complemented by inspections of missile launch pads in situ. The satellites used for this type of verification could, according to Bhupendra Jasani, a renowned military and arms control expert, ideally form “multilateral technical means (MTM)” for the verification of a space weapons ban. In the meantime, civil and commercial satellites have also reached a technical stage capable of supporting verification.

The use of satellites for international verification, be it through an international verification agency’s satellites or by having verification data and imagery of national satellites at its disposal, would pave the way for general international verification for bi- and multilateral arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament treaties. The monitoring and verification mechanism of the CSO Treaty could thus also be used for monitoring the compliance of further arms control and non-proliferation treaties, in particular of the CTBT and the NPT, as well as for crisis prevention purposes.

3. Appropriate international fora for negotiating the agreement

The issue of military uses of outer space has taken on significance for all future space activities. Active military uses of outer space would have considerable repercussions on the safety of civil and particularly commercial uses of space. Further, the impact of such a transgression on international security in terms of nuclear strategy, the relationship between defensive and offensive weapons, and the entire bi- and multilateral arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament regimes, makes it necessary to treat the issue comprehensively from all angles. Therefore, the convocation of a separate international state conference under the
aegis of the UN to negotiate a CSO Treaty would seem to be appropriate. Such a multilateral conference of plenipotentiary state representatives could potentially break the impasse at the CD by negotiating the necessarily comprehensive treaty with sufficient authority that would offer new advantages of a comprehensive security order beneficial in particular to the space powers with regard to their civil space uses. This agreement should, as with the Outer Space Treaty and the specialized space agreements, be approved by the UN General Assembly for its adoption by the international community. One could also consider including NROs and the numerous international scientific organizations dealing with space and disarmament issues at an early stage in the process.

On 5 February 2001, Canada reaffirmed its commitment to convene a review conference on the Outer Space Treaty with the objective to negotiate an additional protocol about the military use of outer space. The proposal for a CSO Treaty, as an implementation agreement of the Outer Space Treaty, could be tabled at such a conference.

4. “Common Security” in outer space as a means to overcome nuclear deterrence

The nuclear-strategic objective of common security is to replace the deterrence strategy of “Mutual Assured Destruction” by “Mutual Assured Security”. Thus, it matches President Reagan’s goals pursued under SDI, and the goals that are currently linked to the introduction of strategic defense systems in the framework of a “strategic transition”. A US national defence against ballistic missile attacks could render nuclear weapons obsolete, thereby causing nuclear offensive weapons to become superfluous. The main difference, however, is that the concept of “common security” wants to achieve this by cooperation and structural change, whereas the proponents of a space-based missile defence view that this could be the result of technological developments in the form of new defensive systems in outer space. Yet, the scientific consensus is quite clear that there cannot be absolute security by technical means.

Overcoming deterrence through a new relationship between offensive and defensive systems and eventually abolition, however, is only possible in a cooperative environment. The recognition by the nuclear powers of the necessity to cooperate in order to achieve security lies at the heart of the concept of common security. Its realization would renounce new armaments in outer space or on Earth.

The concept thus constitutes an ideal basis for a cooperative nuclear strategic transition that would allow the fulfilment of the nuclear disarmament obligations according to Article VI of the NPT, and that would free mankind of the scourge of nuclear terror. Common security opens the perspective for genuine disarmament by establishing on all sides non-provocative structures through defensive configurations. In the words of the late Dieter Lutz:

Common security requires the replacement of the deterrence strategy by a strategy of prevention renouncing any measures of preemption and retaliation (in particular with weapons of mass destruction).  

A strategic transition towards cooperation is also a prerequisite of an active policy of non-proliferation. Developing a multilateral Treaty on Common Security in Outer
Space could facilitate the cooperative transition from MAD to CTR.

**US Senator Lugar,** one of the co-authors of the programmes, rightly demands a globalization of cooperative threat reduction programs. This is only possible in an adequate multilateral framework. Similarly, Europe has strengthened efforts to make the International Code of Conduct against the Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICoC) multilaterally by including a greater number of states with missile technology, in particular China, Pakistan, India, Iran and Israel. An extension of these programmes alone, however, would not suffice to overcome nuclear deterrence. All measures need to be additionally embedded in a comprehensive system of common security.

The interest of mankind-clause under international space law demands that common security interests take precedence over national or bilateral security interests, thus opening the chance for the international community to overcome nuclear deterrence by requiring compliance with the principle of cooperation and the nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT that also applies to outer space.

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1 Both are based on extensive research which I have published in June 2003 in Germany in a monograph entitled: “Grundlagen ‚Gemeinsame Sicherheit‘ im Weltraum nach universellem Völkerrecht. Der Grundsatz der friedlichen Nutzung des Weltraums im Lichte des völkerrechtlichen Strukturprinzips vom Gemeinsamen Erbe der Menschheit, Berlin 2003; s. also Wolter „Common Security in Outer Space and International Law, UNIDIR 2005 (forthcoming)


3 Jonathan Dean, endorsement of my forthcoming book entitled „Common Security in Outer Space and International Law, UNIDIR 2005


5 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Monn and Other Celestial Bodies” (Outer Space Treaty) of 27 January 1967, unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/RES/2222 (XXI), 19 December 1966


11 ICJ Reports 1996, p.264 para. 99


24 Senator Lugar urges to adopt an active global non-proliferation policy proposing the globalisation of the “Nunn-Lugar”-programme of 1991, which was so far limited to the threat reduction of the former Soviet Union. The objective would be to identify, control and finally destroy all WMD worldwide by achieving a “satisfactory level of accountability, transparency, and safety ... in every nation with a WMD program”. He announced a draft bill for this purpose, which should authorize the administration to globalize the “Nunn-Lugar” programme by approaching all relevant States. Speech by Senator Lugar, “NATO After 9/11: Crisis or Opportunity?”, Council on Foreign Relations, 4 March, 2002

25 “Strategic mistrust in the post-Cold War era creates the need for measures to reduce suspicions between and among states about their long-term political, military, and economic objectives - that is, their strategic intentions. Broadly speaking, strategic reassurance measures are steps that one nation takes to address the concerns of other nations that are suspicious of its broad, long-run intentions.” Garret, “The Need for Strategic Reassurance in the 21st Century”, *Arms Control Today* 31, March, 2001, p. 9


28 Canada, “Proposal concerning CD action on Outer Space”, CD/1569, 4 February, 1999; according to the *Space Law Committee of the International Law Association* report of its 69th Conference the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 should not be amended. The proposal for a CSO-Treaty is directed, like the Canadian proposal, at the adoption of a separate agreement of implementation of the Outer Space Treaty in the security field. For various options to be pursued by the UN General Assembly s. Secure World Foundation, *Achieving Space Security. A Preliminary Action Inquiry for a Canadian Campaign to Prevent the Weaponization of Space*. Prepared by the Polaris Institute, February 2005 p. 13


In contrast, Rubin holds the view that, due to the novelty of the question a final assessment would not yet be possible: "Passive and active defense against the missiles and WMD of States of Concern is a natural and understandable response of threatened nations, yet its impact on proliferation is controversial, especially that of missile defense... Critics of the US NMD program maintain that deploying a home front missile defense will not reduce the missile threat from States of Concern but rather prompt the deployment of more, better and deadlier missiles against the US... Proponents of defense, on the other hand, argue that defenses complicate the job of the aggressor, forcing him into costly improvements of his... Due to the novelty of the issue, there is no evidence as yet either way." However, in the final result Rubin also pleads for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. Rubin, “From Incentives to Preemption: Adjusting Options to Deal with Different States of Concern”, UNIDIR/Wilton Park, January, 2002, p.9

31 s. note 29

32 DalBello, “‘Rules of the Road’: Legal Measures to Strengthen the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space”, Proceedings from the 28th Colloquium on Space Law, 1986, p.8

33 Ekblad, “Prospects of Verifying Space Weapons Treaties”, Proceedings from the 35th Colloquium on Space Law, 1993, p.346; Ondrej, “Some Legal Aspects of Verification in and from Outer Space”, Proceedings from the 33rd Colloquium on Space Law, 1991, p.338; Kries, “Satellite Verification and European Arms Control”, Proceedings from the 33rd Colloquium on Space Law, 1991, p.375; Scheffran, “Moving Beyond Missile Defense. The Search for Alternatives for the Missile Race”, INESAP Information Bulletin No. 18, September 2001, p.52; In contrast, Rubin holds the view that, due to the novelty of the question a final assessment would not yet be possible: “Passive and active defense against the missiles and WMD of States of Concern is a natural and understandable response of threatened nations, yet its impact on proliferation is controversial, especially that of missile defense... Critics of the US NMD program maintain that deploying a home front missile defense will not reduce the missile threat from States of Concern but rather prompt the deployment of more, better and deadlier missiles against the US... Proponents of defense, on the other hand, argue that defenses complicate the job of the aggressor, forcing him into costly improvements of his... Due to the novelty of the issue, there is no evidence as yet either way.” However, in the final result Rubin also pleads for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. Rubin, “From Incentives to Preemption: Adjusting Options to Deal with Different States of Concern”, UNIDIR/Wilton Park, January, 2002, p.9

33 s. note 27


35 s. note 27

36 s. note 28


38 Krepon, “Moving Away From MAD”, Survival 43, 2001, p.85;
